Banking Relationships and Access to Equity Capital Markets: Evidence from Japan’s Main Bank System by Kenji Ketsuna et al.
 
Banking Relationships and Access to Equity Capital Markets: 
Evidence from Japan’s Main Bank System 
 
Kenji Kutsuna* 
Graduate School of Business Administration 
Kobe University 
Rokkodai 2-1, Nada, Kobe, 657-8501, Japan 
Kutsuna@rose.rokkodai.kobe-u.ac.jp 
 
Janet Kiholm Smith* 
Von Tobel Professor of Economics 
 Claremont McKenna College  




Richard L. Smith* 
Peter F. Drucker School of Management 
Claremont Graduate University 








We study the role of banking relationships in IPO underwriting.  Among other issues, we consider whether 
banking relationships lead to increased access to public equity markets, especially for smaller, lesser-
known firms.  When a firm in Japan goes public, it can engage an investment bank that is related through a 
common main bank, or can select an alternative investment bank.  The main bank relationship can be an 
efficient way for the investment bank to acquire information generated by the main bank, but may give rise 
to conflicts of interest.  We use data from two different investment banking regimes in Japan (a hybrid 
auction-method regime and a book-building regime) and find that main bank relationships give small 
issuers increased access to equity capital markets, but that issuers of large IPOs switch to non-related 
investment banks that are capable of managing large offerings.  While we find evidence that investment 
banks seek to exploit bargaining power with related issuers, we also find that issuers respond to expected 
high issue cost by switching to non-related investment banks.  The net result is that total issue costs through 
related and non-related investment banks are similar.  With respect to aftermarket performance and use of 
offer proceeds, we find no evidence of conflict of interest or self-dealing for either the main bank or the 
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Policy makers in many countries have grappled with whether integration of 
commercial banking and investment banking services is likely to benefit or harm corporate 
clients and their investors.  If commercial banks are integrated into investment banking, the 
banks might engage in “self-dealing” by underwriting public offerings of credit clients to 
effect wealth transfers from the clients and/or investors to themselves.  Further, integrated 
banks may gain bargaining power over their credit clients who seek investment banking 
services.  On the other hand, the commercial bank’s experience with its clients could reduce 
information costs, resulting in greater access to public capital markets for their clients.   
In the US, early controversy concerning participation of commercial banks in 
corporate securities underwriting resulted in the Glass-Steagall Act (The Banking Act of 
1933).  The Act, which prohibited combining investment and commercial banking functions, 
was enacted in the context of allegations of conflicts of interest and abuse by commercial 
banks that were integrated into investment banking.  Sixty-six years later, Congress reversed 
this policy and repealed the Act’s restrictions on affiliations between securities firms and 
commercial banks.  The reversal signaled that US policy makers had accepted the view that 
potential benefits of improved access outweigh potential conflicts of interest when banks 
provide both lending and underwriting services.
1  One argument in favor of repeal was that 
integration could increase public capital market access for small, young, and/or relatively 
unknown firms.   
                                                           
1 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999) repeals provisions 
contained in Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act. Extant empirical literature on banking relationships and integration of commercial and 
investment banking functions generally does not support the conflict of interest hypothesis.
2  
However, the studies focus on debt and preferred equity or seasoned equity underwriting.  A 
stronger test of the conflict of interest hypothesis would examine, as we do, those securities 
issues for which informational asymmetries are likely to be material, such as initial public 
offerings (IPOs).  Furthermore, there is little modern evidence on how relationships between 
commercial and investment banks may facilitate capital market access.           
Investment banks can be related to commercial banks in various ways, ranging from 
complete integration (at one extreme) to overlapping ownership and management, as in Japan, 
where, banks are related through keiretzu structures.  In this paper we examine the role of 
banking relationships in Japan’s IPO underwriting market.  In Japan, the keiretzu structure 
allows main banks to hold equity interests in their commercial banking clients, including 
investment banks.  Issuing firms can choose whether to engage an investment bank that is 
related to it by virtue of sharing the same main bank.  The study contributes to the literature in 
two ways.  First, we examine the pricing and performance of information-intensive securities 
and do so in a period of extreme financial system stress for Japan (l995-1999).  Both 
information asymmetry and financial system stress increase incentives for bankers to behave 
opportunistically.  Thus, we “stack the deck” in favor of finding evidence of conflicts, thereby 
addressing a gap in empirical research.  The time period of the study has the additional 
advantage of spanning two different underwriting regimes—a hybrid auction regime (variants 
of which are in use in several countries) and a book-building regime (similar to the US 
method).
3  This feature allows us to contrast the importance of main bank relationships across 
                                                           
2 We review the literature below in Section II.   
3 See Sherman (2002) for documentation on IPO methods used internationally.     
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 two very different underwriting processes.  Second, we examine issuing firms’ choices to 
engage related investment banks to underwrite IPOs.  We look at a spectrum of IPO 
underwriting outcomes to evaluate whether banking relationships lead to conflicts of interest.  
We examine the impact of relationships on total costs (including fees and underpricing), 
issuing firm access to public equity markets, aftermarket performance of issues, and use of 
issue proceeds.     
The conflict of interest hypothesis is that when an issuer is related to an investment 
bank, the investment bank may seek to deceive investors into overvaluing the issue and/or 
may cause the firms to issue for the benefit of the investment bank or commercial bank.  The 
conflicts of interest can be manifested in several ways.
4  First, by misleading investors about 
the value of an issue, a related underwriter can attempt to effect a wealth transfer from IPO 
investors to the issuer and/or the commercial bank. Second, if the commercial bank’s lending 
activities give the related investment bank bargaining power, the investment bank can attempt 
to exploit its information advantage by charging higher fees or underpricing the issue more 
than would be possible in a market where no underwriter has an information advantage.  In 
this case, the wealth transfer is from the issuer to the underwriter and IPO investors 
(underpricing may indirectly benefit the underwriter).
5  Third, the value of the issuer could be 
reduced by inappropriately using issue proceeds to pay off a risky outstanding loan to the 
commercial bank, thereby harming existing investors.  
Alternatively, when an issuer is related to an investment bank through a common 
commercial bank, the relationship may lower the costs of obtaining information or improve 
                                                           
4 For discussion of the types of conflicts of interest that may arise in this setting, see Benston (l990) 
5 Total issue cost includes underpricing, which benefits investors directly.  However, underwriters may expect to 
be compensated in indirect ways for allocating underpriced shares to favored investors.  See Loughran and Ritter 
(2003) who discuss allocations of “hot” IPOs to the personal brokerage accounts of issuing firm executives.   
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 information quality.  The information hypothesis suggests that relationships between 
commercial banks and investment banks benefit issuers and increase access to capital 
markets.    
To test these alternative hypotheses, we use Japanese data and assume that issuing 
firms seek to minimize total issue cost by their selection of the investment bank.   
Correspondingly, by examining aftermarket performance, we test whether investment banks’ 
due diligence and pre-marketing activities lead investors to make unbiased assessments of 
issuers’ aftermarket values.     
Our findings demonstrate that small firms that undertake small IPOs tend to engage 
their related investment banks.  While the evidence indicates that related investment banks try 
to underprice more, issuing firms are able to respond by selecting non-related investment 
banks.  The result is that issue costs are no higher for issuers who elect to use a related 
investment bank.  We find no significant evidence that issuers or capital market investors in 
Japan are harmed by relationships between main banks and investment banks, and instead 
find that banking relationships increase capital market access for small firms making small 
issues.     
II.   Banking Relationships and Credit Markets 
  The effects of banking relationships on access to capital and on borrowing cost have 
been subject to extensive theoretical and empirical study.  One stream of literature concerns 
the effects of commercial bank relationships on access to credit.  A second stream concerns 
the conflicts of interest that arise when commercial banks integrate into investment banking.  
A third concerns how organizational choices can mitigate investor concerns with conflicts.        
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 A.  Banking Relationships and Access to Credit    
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) observe that market frictions related to information 
asymmetry can impede the flow of capital to investments.  Leland and Pyle (1977), Campbell 
and Kracaw (1980), Diamond (1984, 1991), and Fama (1985) all suggest that firms with close 
ties to financial institutions should have access to lower cost funds.   
Consistent with these theoretical studies, Petersen and Rajan (1994) hypothesize that 
institutional creditors can partially overcome market frictions by producing information about 
firms and using the information in their credit decisions.  They find that close ties with 
creditors have a small effect on the cost of credit, but that availability of credit financing is 
greater for firms with ties to creditors.  Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) study credit 
relationships in Japan and find that firms with close ties to commercial banks are less likely to 
be liquidity constrained.
6 
There are several reasons for expecting that banking relationships may facilitate access 
to capital markets.  Recognizing that banks that are related to issuers have an information 
advantage, James (1984) provides evidence of a certification role of commercial banks and 
James and Weir (1990) demonstrate that the existence of a commercial bank lending 
relationship results in less IPO underpricing.  Diamond (1984) observes that, in conjunction 
with providing credit, commercial banks also perform a monitoring function and that the full 
cost of bank credit must compensate the lender for monitoring costs.       
                                                           
6 Berger and Udell (l995) study commercial bank relationships and their importance to small firms.  They find 
that such relationships are a likely mechanism for solving asymmetric information problems and that they 
provide valuable information about firm quality.  For a survey of the literature on relationship banking, see Boot 
(l999).    
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 B.  Commercial Bank Integration into Investment Banking 
Rajan (1992) models the borrower’s choice between informed bank debt and arms-
length public debt as an aspect of the firm’s effort to offset the benefits of the related lender’s 
ongoing monitoring against the lender’s bargaining power.  If commercial bank relationships 
yield information advantages, then integration of commercial banking and investment banking 
in a single institution may enhance a lender’s bargaining power.  In addition, a lender that is 
integrated into investment banking is faced with a conflict of interest, in that the proceeds of 
capital market financing may be used to extinguish bank debt. 
Puri (1999), in a model that is focused on public credit markets, compares the 
certification capabilities of commercial banks that are integrated into investment banking to 
the certification capabilities of independent investment banks.  She concludes that commercial 
banks are able to certify higher values than are investment banks, based on access to 
information derived through pre-existing lending relationships.  She also concludes that a 
commercial bank’s ability to certify is reduced when issue proceeds are used to extinguish 
debt that is owed to the bank and that equity ownership in the issuer also reduces ability to 
certify.   
Several empirical studies have tested the conflict of interest hypothesis by examining 
the US experience in the pre-Glass-Steagall era, when commercial banks legally could make 
loans to firms and also underwrite their securities.  The hypothesis suggests that default rates 
would be higher for commercial-bank-underwritten debt than for investment-bank-
underwritten debt.  Ang and Richardson (1994), Kroszner and Rajan (1994) and Puri (1994) 
examine the ex post default performance of debt securities underwritten by commercial banks 
and by investment banks and Puri (l996) examines the pricing of the debt issues, arguing that 
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 looking only at ex post performance is incomplete because pricing should reflect expected 
default rates. The studies find that issues underwritten by commercial banks have lower 
default rates.  Using data from l927-1929, Puri (l996) compares the pricing of debt and 
preferred stock underwritten by commercial banks with the pricing of similar securities 
underwritten by investment banks.  Consistent with Puri (1999), she finds that commercial 
banks are able to certify higher values, particularly for securities where information costs are 
high.  Her evidence indicates that commercial banks may generate an information advantage 
that benefits issuers through higher net proceeds. 
C.    Choice of Organizational Structure 
Given the tension between information cost savings and conflict of interest, the 
structure of banking organizations can be expected to reflect efforts to realize information cost 
savings while mitigating conflicts.  Kroszner and Rajan (l997) use pre-Glass-Steagall data to 
study how the degree of integration affects issue quality and pricing.  They conclude that 
market pressures induced commercial banks to address conflicts of interest by choosing levels 
of integration into investment banking (separately incorporated bank affiliates versus 
integrated investment banking departments).              
Several studies examine US experience in the years since deregulation.
7  While data 
are limited, the studies indicate that commercial banks seeking to integrate underwriting 
activities have responded to concerns about conflict of interest though their choices of 
organizational form.  Using reasoning similar to Kroszner and Rajan, Narayanan, Rangan and 
Rangan (2001) argue that commercial banks can use underwriting syndicates to militate 
against opportunism.  They find that syndicate arrangements are rewarded with better prices 
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 for seasoned equity issues compared to prices obtained when such issues are underwritten by 
a commercial bank that has a lending relationship with the issuer.
8  Chaplinsky and Erwin 
(2001) study structural change in US equity underwriting since deregulation.  They find that 
commercial banks have made inroads into investment banking, but mainly through acquisition 
of independent investment banks.  The aggregate market share of merged firms declines 
significantly following merger and the decline is more pronounced for IPOs than seasoned 
offerings.  This finding challenges the importance of information economies that may arise 
from lending relationships, and suggests that client firms are concerned about potential 
conflicts when integrated banks underwrite issues.      
Overall, the evidence from previous research suggests that elimination of regulatory 
constraints on integration of lending and underwriting is not harmful to investors or issuers.  
However, success at integration depends on how the organizational structure addresses 
potential conflicts of interest, and at the same time, realizes the informational economies from 
the lending function. 
III.  Investment Banking Institutions in Japan 
During the period of our study, commercial banks in Japan were prohibited from 
direct involvement in investment banking.
9  However, unlike in the US, commercial banks, 
investment banks, and other firms could be involved in long-term main-bank-centered 
relationships.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7 Beginning in l989, the Federal Reserve selectively allowed banks to underwrite debt and equity securities using 
an exemption found in section 20 of Glass-Steagall Act.  Deregulation culminated in the l999 Gramm-Leach-
Bliley, supra, note 1.    
8 Also see Gande et al. (l997), who examine debt issues by commercial banks that set up Section 20 subsidiaries 
subject to “firewalls” that limit information and financial linkages between them and their respective parent 
holding companies. They find that, with these protections in place, in-house underwriting does not lead to greater 
conflicts.          
9 Although commercial banks could own equity in investment banks, Section 65 of Japan’s Securities and 
Exchange Law (l948) prohibited mergers of commercial banks and securities firms.       
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 A.  Japan’s Main Bank System         
The post-war Japanese financial system was bank-dominated because of a 
combination of strong government favoritism of bank financing and tight regulation of 
securities markets.  Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) note that within the banking system, firms 
developed a particularly tight relationship with a specific bank, often identified as a “main 
bank” relationship.  In a comprehensive study, Aoki and Patrick (1994) describe the main- 
bank system as an “informal set of regular practices, institutional arrangement, and behavior 
that constitute a system of corporate finance and governance…”  (p. xxxi).  They state, “The 
main bank not only provides loans, it holds equity, and, in the eyes of the capital market 
participants and regulators, is expected to monitor the firm and intervene when things go 
wrong. (p. 2).   Hoshi and Kashyap note that, by definition, a main bank has “close ties to its 
customers through lending, shareholding and (often) board representation and other personnel 
placement.”(p. 190).   
Some recent literature challenges the economic significance of these keiretsu 
relationships.
10  The evidence from these studies suggests that the costs of the keiretsu system, 
and the attendant main bank relationships, are growing while the benefits are declining.   
Further, this literature suggests that the weakening of keiretsu ties has been more pronounced 
during the last decade, as financial deregulation in the l990s has taken hold and capital 
markets have deepened.  Therefore, our analysis also is an implicit test of whether these 
informal networks continue to be economically significant.   
The late 1990s was a period of turmoil for Japan’s financial system. The system’s 
solvency was jeopardized by a common practice of banks over-extending credit to existing 
                                                           
10 See Miwa and Ramseyer (2002) and Okamura (2000).      
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 clients and making new loans to problem customers to disguise and postpone defaults.
11  
During this period, Japan was aggressively restructuring, deregulating, and opening its 
financial system and markets through a series of changes, culminating in the later part of the 
l990s in what has been referred to as the Big Bang.
12 
B.  Regulation of Public Offerings in Japan 
During the l995 to 1999 period, two different regulatory regimes governed the initial 
public offering process.  From l995 though late l997, IPO issuers were required to use a 
hybrid auction method.  Since late l997 issuers have been permitted to select either the 
auction method or a book-building method similar to the US method.  Since shortly after its 
introduction, all issuers in Japan have selected book building.  Additionally, the equity capital 
market over the period was tumultuous.  Coinciding with the auction portion of our sample 
period, the equity market in Japan declined steadily.  Between January 1995 and the end of 
September 1997, the JASDAQ Index lost 45 percent of its value.  During the book-building 
portion of our sample period, the JASDAQ index appreciated by 139 percent.  Hence, for both 
reasons, the environments for security offerings were very different between the two regimes. 
Previous research by Kutsuna and Smith (2003) documents significant differences in 
the outcomes of the IPO process under these two regimes.  In particular, they find that, 
compared to book building, the underwriter’s role in the auction regime is more limited, and 
that smaller and riskier firms were more likely to go public in the book-building regime.            
The Auction Regime: Under the hybrid auction procedure, in place in Japan from l989 
until late 1997, the issuer designated a portion of the issue (usually 50 percent) to be offered 
                                                           
11 See Brewer, et al. (2003) examine the failures of three Japanese banks during this period and the 
accompanying stock market reactions.   
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 via a discriminatory auction.  Prior to the auction, the firm’s underwriter issued a preliminary 
prospectus that specified a minimum bid, based on a mandated formula.  Regulations 
precluded insider participation in the auction and limited the maximum number of shares any 
single participant could bid to acquire.  After the auction was complete, the underwriter would 
conduct a formal firm-commitment offering of remaining shares, where the issue price was 
determined based on demand information obtained from the auction.           
  The underwriter’s role in the auction method IPO was limited.  The underwriter used 
the formula to set the minimum bid price, conducted the auction, set the public offer price 
based on the auction results, and conducts the firm-commitment offering.  In addition, the 
underwriter conducted due diligence on the issuer and prepared the preliminary and final 
prospectuses used in the offering and effectively guaranteed the firm commitment offer price 
to the issuer.  During the auction regime, underwriter fees were fixed by informal agreement 
at artificially low levels, averaging 3.4 percent of gross proceeds.  
The Book-building Regime: The book-building method, introduced in Japan in late 
l997, is modeled after the US system.  Under this system, underwriters and issuers use road 
shows and other pre-marketing methods to assess indications of interest, and determine offer 
price.  There is no requirement that the offer price be linked by formula to values of 
comparable firms and there is no limit on the number of shares that any one investor can 
purchase.  The underwriter can allocate shares of over-subscribed offerings to preferred 
customers, as in the US.  Under the book-building method, as in the US, the underwriter 
establishes a filing range that appears in the preliminary prospectus.  The filing range is set 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
12 Restrictions that separate commercial and investment banking were not lifted until October 1999.  Hoshi and 
Kashyap (2001) note, at p. 291, that restrictions that separate banking, securities business, and insurance were 
completely lifted by April 2001.        
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 based on the underwriter’s due diligence and examination of market valuations of other 
issues. 
  The two underwriting approaches encompass very different roles for underwriters.  In 
the auction regime, the underwriter’s role is more passive, and issue pricing is determined 
mainly by the results of the auction.  In the book-building regime, the underwriter establishes 
the filing range based on its due diligence and valuation efforts, and pre-sells the issue.  Thus, 
we expect that main bank relationships may be less important for improving capital market 
access in the auction regime.  Our evidence is consistent with this expectation.        
IV. Data 
Our data include all JASDAQ IPOs over the period l995 through 1999, 484 total IPOs, 
including 321 from the auction regime and 163 from the book-building regime.  While a few 
companies in Japan go public on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the overwhelming majority of 
IPOs in Japan occur on JASDAQ. 
A. Issue  Characteristics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for IPOs during both regimes.  The many 
significant differences between the regimes suggest that we examine the effects of main bank 
relationships separately for the two regimes.  Panel (a) shows characteristics of the issuing 
firms.  Consistent with the above discussion, firms going public during the auction regime are 
older than firms going public during book building.  Market capitalization, which we use as a 
measure of firm size, shows that average size in book building is larger but median size is 
lower.  While the difference in means is not statistically significant, the book-building regime 
includes a more varied and skewed distribution of issue sizes.  The relative proportions of 
firms in commercial, manufacturing, service, and other industries are similar over the two 
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 periods.  The money center variable measures the number of IPOs completed in a firm’s 
prefecture during the sample period, and is used as an indicator of the firm’s proximity to a 
major money center.  Access to leading commercial banks and investment banks may depend 
on the issuer’s location.  Tokyo prefecture, for example, had the highest level of IPO activity, 
with 241 IPOs (49.8 percent of the sample).  Next were Aichi with 33, Osaka with 30, and 
Kanagawa with 29.  Five of Japan’s 47 prefectures had no IPOs during the period, 14 had 
only one IPO.            
Panel (b) shows information on market-wide value changes or “run-up” in the 
JASDAQ Index in the 20-day interval and 40-day interval before the IPO.  Market-wide value 
change before the IPO are expected to affect realized total issue cost, as offer terms do not 
fully adjust to market-wide changes.  Significant differences in market-wide value changes 
between the regimes are apparent in the averages.  The table also shows market-adjusted one-
month and 12-month mean and median returns following the IPO, but the differences in 
aftermarket performance between regimes are not statistically significant.   
Offer characteristics displayed in panel (c) indicate that average issue size is similar in 
both regimes.  However, issue size is more variable in the book-building regime and the 
distribution is more highly skewed.  Average total issue cost is significantly higher during the 
book-building regime.  Issue cost is measured as underwriting fee plus underpricing per share, 
divided by first aftermarket price.  In part, the difference between regimes is attributable to 
the difference in market run-up that is documented in panel (b).  This is because pricing of 
issues reflects information available 20 to 40 days prior to issue; hence, the greater the run-up 
the greater the underpricing will be.   
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 Panel (c) also contains information on use of proceeds.  Use-of-proceeds percentages 
are based on primary shares.  On average, 40 percent of IPO shares in the auction regime, and 
39 percent in the book-building regime, were secondary sales.  As shown, there are 
differences between regimes in the reported uses of primary-share proceeds.  Most notably, 
during the book-building regime, use of proceeds to repay debt is lower and issuing firms 
report a higher percentage of proceeds not identified with any specific purpose.  Conceivably, 
it is more important for a prospectus to specify proceed uses when shares are sold via auction, 
as the underwriter’s role in auction IPOs is more limited.   
Finally, panel (d) contains information on main bank relationships and underwriter 
market share.  The variable,  “Related I-Bank” indicates whether the underwriter and the 
issuing firm are related through the same main bank.  Consistent with the view that keiretsu 
relationships are weakening, the percent of issues that involve related investment banks is low 
during both regimes.  In contrast, the percent of IPO issuers using major underwriters is high 
in both regimes.  The suggestion is that issuers face tradeoffs between the potential benefits of 
main bank relationships and the potential benefits of using a major underwriter to conduct the 
IPO.    
B. Main  Bank  Relationships 
  In Table 2, we identify the investment banks that underwrote IPOs during the study 
period and their affiliated main banks.  For issuers, we rely on Research Group for Disclosure 
identification of main banks, which is based on information from the issuer’s prospectus.  
Main bank affiliations of investment banks are determined on the basis of the commercial 
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 bank’s holding of equity in the investment bank as of March l999.
13  Equity holdings are 
reported by Toyo Keizai Databank on Kigyo Keiretsu (2000).   
Figures in Table 2 for “I-Bank Market Share” are the percentages of IPOs, during each 
regime, that were underwritten by the specified investment bank.  For example, Nomura is the 
largest underwriter, and underwrote approximately 33 percent of the IPOs over the sample 
period.  Similarly, figures for “Main Bank Market Share” are the percentages of issuers that 
are affiliated with a specified main bank.  To illustrate, Sakura is the main bank of 8.1 percent 
of the sample firms during the auction regime.  Figures in the “Related Bank Market Share” 
column are the percentages of IPOs where the issuer and the underwriter have the same main 
bank.  The column shows, for example, that during the auction regime, for 2.5 percent of all 
issues, Nomura underwrote the issue of firms that had Sakura their main bank.   
The bottom row of the table shows the percentages of IPOs for which the issuer’s 
commercial bank is small.  As shown, during the auction regime, 35.5 percent of issuers had 
main banks that were not main banks of any underwriter.  These small commercial banks tend 
to be located in prefectures with low IPO activity, and while these banks may own some 
equity in investment banks, they are not main banks of any investment bank.     
  Table 2 shows a clear demarcation between the few investment banks with high IPO 
market shares and the larger number with low shares.  In subsequent analysis, we classify 
investment banks with market shares above 10 percent during a regime as major underwriters.  
Nomura, Daiwa, and Nikko are classified as majors in both regimes.  Yamaichi, which was a 
major during the auction regime, failed around the time of the change to book building.  For 
                                                           
13 Because of the bankruptcy of investment bank, Yamaichi, in late l997, we use equity holdings as of March 
l995 to identify Yamaichi’s main bank for those IPOs underwritten prior to bankruptcy.  Also, due to the merger 
of Nikko Securities and Solomon in l998, we use equity holdings as of March l998 to identify the main bank for 
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 major underwriters, the percentages of issues where the issuer and the investment bank are 
related generally are somewhat higher than what would be expected by chance assignment of 
issuers to investment banks based on investment bank market shares.  Most small investment 
banks have lower than expected percentages of related issues.  A few, Kankaku in particular, 
have higher levels of related IPOs than would be expected by chance.  Overall, the evidence 
in Table 2 suggests that issuers sometimes migrate to large investment banks and other times 
remain with their related investment bank.
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
An issuer’s relationship with an investment bank is determined, in part, by the issuer’s 
locality.  In the Tokyo prefecture, for example, 42.7 percent of issuers were affiliated with 
major underwriters.  In contrast, only 15.2 percent of issuers in other prefectures were 
affiliated with major underwriters.  In areas other than Japan’s main money center, issuers are 
more likely to have small main banks that are affiliated with smaller investment banks, or to 
have commercial banks that do not have a main bank relationship with any investment bank.  
We classify IPOs as conducted by a “non-related” investment bank unless the issuer has a 
direct relationship to the investment bank through a common main bank.
14     
III.  Empirical Results 
A.    Bivariate Statistics and Tests of Conflict of Interest and Capital Market Access  
  Table 3 shows characteristics of IPOs using related and non-related investment banks, 
and Table 4 shows characteristics of IPOs using major and non-major investment banks.  We 
use these bivariate comparisons to test for conflicts of interest and to examine the impact of 
 
all Nikko-backed IPOs prior to that date and use holdings as of March l999 for IPO observations dated from 
April l998 to the end of the sample period.               
14 Small commercial banks may have correspondent relationships with money-center banks and issuers may use 
those relationships to increase access to a major investment bank.
 In our sample, investment banks that are 
related to a correspondent of the issuer’s main bank underwrote 12 IPOs that we classify as non-related.  We 
replicated the empirical analysis presented below, reclassifying these observations as related.  Results are similar 
to those reported.      
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 banking relationships on capital market access.  Because the regimes generally cannot be 
pooled, we test the auction and book-building regimes separately.  The tables also report 
significant tests on the combined data from both regimes.   
Use of Related and Non-related Investment Banks: As reported in Table 3, in both 
regimes, IPOs of firms related to investment banks have lower mean total issue cost and lower 
underpricing.  However, these issues also have more negative JASDAQ performance over the 
40 days before the IPO.  Thus, in part, differences in issue cost are attributable to differences 
in market-wide performance before the IPO. 
The difference in market run-up for IPOs using related versus non-related investment 
bank does not preclude the possibility that the observed cost differences result partly from 
using a related investment bank.  The joint probability that, by chance, market run-ups of 
IPOs with related investment banks would be significantly lower at the observed levels in 
both regimes is less than one percent.  However, we can find no obvious explanation for the 
difference.  For example, in neither regime is there a secular timing difference between 
related and non-related IPOs that might produce a spurious result associated with the drift of 
the market.  Conceivably, related investment banks are more willing to underwrite IPOs 
following declining or non-rising markets.  Also, issues involving non-related investment 
banks may more likely be cancelled in the face of market declines.  We tested for this 
indirectly, by comparing the percent of IPOs with zero or negative run-ups over the 40 days 
before the offering.  Consistent with this possibility, the percentages of IPOs with non-
positive run-ups were significantly higher for non-related investment banks in both regimes.  
Alternatively, investment banks may be better able to time the issues of related firms.
15  
                                                           
15 Or, if non-related investment banks have market timing ability, they may use it to increase ex post 
underpricing, to the detriment of issuers. 
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 Because we use market run-up as a control variable in subsequent empirical analysis, it is 
important to recognize that the analysis masks this possible benefit of using a related 
investment bank. 
Consistent with the hypothesis that banking relationships increase capital market 
access for small firms, the market share evidence shows, generally, that when issuers use non-
related investment banks, they tend to select investment banks with high market shares.  In the 
auction regime, 259 issuers (80.7 percent) used major investment banks.  Had all issuers used 
their related investment banks, only 101 issues (31.5 percent) would have been underwritten 
by majors.   In the book-building regime, the shift was to 131 issues (80.4 percent) from a 
default level of 39 issues (23.9 percent).  Consistent with this, issuers who used related 
investment banks were significantly more likely to be related to major underwriters. 
“Default Major Underwriter” is a binary variable that equals 1 if the issuer is related to 
an investment bank that is classified as a major underwriter; the variable equals 0 if the 
issuer’s main bank does not have an existing relationship with a major underwriter.
16  The 
table shows that, during the auction regime, 62.2 percent of those issuing firms that selected a 
related investment bank were affiliated with a major investment bank; however, only 26.4 
percent of those that selected a non-related investment bank were affiliated with a major 
investment bank.  A similar pattern emerges during the book-building regime.  The results 
suggest that the choice to use a non-related investment bank stems from the firm not having a 
relationship to a major underwriter.   
                                                           
16 If the main bank is related to both a major and a non-major investment bank, we classify the issuer as having a 
default major underwriter.  This classification only applies to issuers whose main bank is Sakura, as Sakura Bank 
is affiliated with both Nomura (major) and Kokusai (non-major).  In the auction regime, none of the firms that 
had Sakura as a main bank used Kokusai as the investment bank.  In the book-building regime, one issuing firm, 
with Sakura as its main bank, elected to use Kokusai.   
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 Also, if a firm uses a non-related investment bank, that investment bank is more likely 
to be a major underwriter.  For example, in the auction regime, in 83.7 percent of the IPOs 
where issuers used non-related investment banks, the investment bank was a major 
underwriter; whereas in only 62.2 percent of the IPOs where issuers used related investment 
banks was the investment bank a major underwriter.  The patterns are similar, but less 
significant in the book-building regime.                    
Several results from the “Issue Details” panel of Table 3 suggest that related 
investment banks facilitate equity market access for smaller firms making smaller offers, 
especially during the book-building regime. Also, issuers located in non-money center 
prefectures, characterized by low IPO activity, are more likely to select non-related 
investment banks in both regimes.  The weaker relationships to various issue details during 
the auction regime are consistent with the more limited role of the underwriter in the auction 
regime.  Issuers related to their investment banks are older in both regimes.  It appears that 
firm age is associated with traditional-economy firms, where traditional keiretzu relationships 
may be stronger.  Older firms tend to be in manufacturing and transportation industries and 
younger firms tend to be in the services, commercial, and financial industries.       
  Next, in Table 3 we report mean and median JASDAQ-adjusted returns for one- and 
12-month intervals after the IPO.  The differences in one-month returns are not significant for 
either regime.  We use one-month returns as an indicator of whether a difference exists in the 
propensities for related and non-related investment banks to artificially support the issue 
prices.  We examine returns over 12 months to test for the possibility that related investment 
banks are more likely to conceal negative information from investors and whether first 
aftermarket prices suggest that investors rationally provide for conflicts of interest in IPOs 
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 underwritten by related investment banks.  Differences in mean 12-month returns are not 
significant.  There also are no material differences in median returns.     
While these estimates suggest that investors are not misled into overvaluing issuers 
that employ related investment banks, the models do not directly examine the concern with 
self-dealing.  Main banks could engage in self-dealing either by participating as a selling 
shareholder in the offerings or by causing primary proceeds to be used to redeem debt owed 
to the main bank.  Although self-dealing that is anticipated by the market does not harm new 
investors in the issuer, it could, by transferring wealth from the issuer to the main bank, harm 
existing investors.     
We examine the possibility of self-dealing by analyzing differences in the use of 
proceeds of issuers using related versus non-related investment banks.  Table 3 shows the 
percentage allocations of total proceeds to secondary versus primary shares and the 
percentage allocations of primary proceeds to specific uses.  We find no significant 
differences in either regime in the percentages of total proceeds allocated to secondary sales 
of shares.  Nor, in either regime, are issuers who use related investment banks significantly 
more likely to use proceeds to redeem outstanding debt.
17   
Use of Major and Non-major Investment Banks: As reported in Table 4, there are no 
significant differences in issue costs or market run-up for major versus other investment 
banks.  The results intimate the importance of investment bank relationships:  the information 
on “Related Investment Bank” shows that major investment banks are more likely to 
underwrite IPOs of non-related issuers in both regimes.  To illustrate, during the auction 
regime, when the selected underwriter is not a major, the issuer and the investment bank are 
                                                           
17 We also estimated OLS models of the use of proceeds to redeem debt as functions of relationships to 
investment banks and the investment bank market share.  None of these models produced significant results.    
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 related 27.4 percent of the time.  In contrast when the selected investment bank is a major, the 
issuer and selected investment bank are related only 10.8 percent of the time.   
The difference in importance of the underwriter in the two regimes is suggested by the 
contrasting findings for percent of IPOs with default major underwriters.    From the medians 
in Table 1, we know that smaller firms with smaller issues were more likely to issue during 
book building than auction, suggesting a more important information-production role for the 
main bank and suggesting that banking relationships are more important in the book-building 
regime.  The results show that, during book building, when an issuer selects a major 
investment bank, 72.3 percent of the time the firm’s default investment bank is a non-major 
(27.7 percent of the time the default is a major underwriter).  In comparison, when an issuer 
selects a non-major, 90.9 percent of the time the default is a non-major.  During this period, 
issuers tend to stay with their related underwriters even if the related underwriter is not a 
major.  In contrast, during the auction regime, when an issuer selected a non-major 
underwriter, the default underwriter was a non-major 67.7 percent of the time (default major 
underwriter is 32.3 percent).  Issuing firms selecting non-major underwriters were more likely 
to stay with their related bank in the book-building regime than in the auction regime.  The 
latter result suggests that during the auction regime, banking relationships were less important 
for gaining capital market access.  The issue details summarized in Table 4 provide additional 
evidence that larger firms with larger issues tend to engage major investment banks. 
B.  Empirical Models of Investment Bank Relationship and Choice or Underwriter 
 
To better understand the determinants of issuer relationships to major investment 
banks, we present three regression models in Table 5. The dependent variable in the first 
(probit) model takes on the value of one if the issuing firm has a relationship with a major 
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 investment bank.  We include as independent variables: firm age, firm size (market 
capitalization), firm location (money center), and control variables for industry (the omitted 
category is real estate, construction, and other) and for the underwriting regime.  Results 
indicate that issuers located in large money centers (Tokyo, Osaka, etc.) are more likely to 
have relationships with major underwriters.  Except for the binary regime variable, other 
variables in the model are not statistically significant.
18   
The finding, that firms in more remote prefectures are less likely to have an existing 
relationship with a major underwriter, raises a question:  how do remotely located firms gain 
access to equity capital markets?  Do they rely on their existing banking relationships, or do 
they bypass the relationships and employ major investment banks?  The second (probit) 
model in Table 5 examines whether the issuer employs a major investment bank.  Independent 
variables include issue size (rather than market capitalization), an indicator for small banks 
that do not have main bank relationships, and industry control variables.
19  The results 
indicate that firms seeking to raise small amounts of equity are less likely to employ major 
underwriters and that firms in non-money centers are likely to employ a major underwriter 
(although the latter result is not statistically strong).   
The third (OLS) model in Table 5 addresses the question of what factors influence an 
issuing firm’s choice to either stay with their related investment bank or to switch 
underwriters?  “Change to Major Underwriter” is a directional variable that takes on a value 
of 1, 0 or –1. The variable equals one if the issuer did not have a related major underwriter 
and switched to a major for the IPO; equals zero if the issuer did not change the size of the 
                                                           
18 We also examined the two regimes separately for the models in Table 5.  Results were similar between 
regimes. 
19 In the first model in Table 5, we use firm size (market capitalization), not issue size, because firm size is 
theoretically more defensible as an exogenous variable to explain an existing relationship.            
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 underwriter:  it either had a related major underwriter and chose to use that underwriter or 
switched to another major, or had a related non-major underwriter and chose to use that 
underwriter or switched to another non-major; and equals minus one if the issuer had a related 
major underwriter and chose to use a non-major underwriter.   The estimates show that issuers 
who are undertaking larger IPOs, those without main bank relationships to investment banks, 
and those located outside of major money centers, tend to switch to major investment banks.  
The finding that older firms are less likely to change banks is consistent with the view that 
keiretzu relationships are more important for more traditional firms.                 
In summary, Table 5 results suggest that the issuer’s choice to use a related 
underwriter depends on size of the issue and on other incentives of the firm to change to a 
major underwriter.  We use these findings in the subsequent section where we present tests of 
the conflict of interest hypothesis by estimating total issue cost and choice to use a related 
investment bank.                   
C.    Empirical Models of Issue Cost and the Conflict of Interest Hypothesis  
We use two approaches to examine the effects of main bank relationships on access to 
equity capital markets and issue cost.
20  For each approach we estimate the model separately 
for both regimes and for the pooled data.    The first is a simultaneous-equation system of total 
issue cost and the investment bank’s relationship to the issuer.  From this model, we find that 
the partial effect of the investment bank’s relationship to the issuer is positively related to 
issue cost.  However, the estimates of the investment bank relationship model indicate that 
issuers respond to expected high issue cost by selecting non-related investment banks.  As the 
total issue cost models do not control for the issuer’s ability to select a non-related investment 
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 bank, they do not reveal whether, on net, issuers who use related investment banks are worse 
off.  To assess the net effect of the investment bank relationship on total issue cost, we 
estimate an OLS model of total issue cost.  We find that realized total issue cost is similar for 
issues involving related and non-related investment banks.   
  Simultaneous Estimates of Total Issue Cost and Investment Bank Relationship: 
Table 6 shows the results of the simultaneous equation system.  In the Total Issue Cost 
Model, we include as explanatory variables, the (simultaneously determined) choice to use a 
related investment bank, underwriter market share, and measures of firm age, issue size, 
market run-up, and one-month aftermarket return.  Except for aftermarket return, we restrict 
the coefficients to be the same for related and non-related issues.   
The coefficient on the “Related Investment Bank” variable reflects the partial effect of 
the relationship on total issue cost.  Thus, it serves as a test of the investment bank’s effort to 
exploit a relationship by offering a noncompetitive total issue cost.  As total issue cost is only 
observable after the offering, the issuer would perceive the underwriter’s effort to exploit its 
bargaining power in the form of a low valuation of the issuer’s shares and possibly (in the 
book-building regime) high fees for underwriting the issue.  To test whether related 
investment banks attempt to exploit IPO investors by concealing negative information or 
otherwise inducing investors to over-value the shares of related issuers, we include an 
interaction of the related bank binary variable and the JASDAQ-adjusted one-month 
aftermarket return. 
  The coefficient on Related Investment Bank is positive in both regimes, though 
statistical significance levels are low.  The results suggest that investment banks attempt to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
20 We also estimated a Heckman model of the choice to use a related or non-related underwriter and of total issue 
cost, conditional on the choice.  Because of the low numbers of observations of IPOs using related investment 
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 underprice the IPOs of related issuers more than they would underprice the IPOs of non-
related issuers.  The positive coefficient on the interaction of relationship with one-month 
aftermarket return suggests that issues underwritten by related investment banks have more 
positive one-month returns than those underwritten by non-related investment banks.  The 
result is inconsistent with the hypothesis that related investment banks successfully lead 
investors to overvalue the shares of related issuers.  Rather, it appears that investors tend to 
undervalue the shares.  However, the average difference is less than one-quarter of one 
percent and, the long-run median returns are virtually identical for related and non-related 
issues.  Thus, undervaluation by investors does not appear to be economically significant.  
Other coefficients in the total issue cost model indicate that high-market share underwriters 
tend to underprice more, that firm age and issue size tend to reduce issue cost (as a percent of 
aftermarket value), and that issue cost is higher following a period of market run-up.  In the 
model that combines both regimes, the book-building regime indicator variable shows that 
total issue cost is higher in the book-building regime.     
In the Underwriter Affiliation Model of Table 6, the dependent variable takes on a 
value of one if the firm chooses to use a related underwriter.  We include as explanatory 
variables, (simultaneously determined) total issue cost, the selected investment bank’s market 
share of IPO underwriting during the regime, and a measure of issue size.  While total issue 
cost is not observable prior to choosing an underwriter, we include it as a proxy for expected 
cost of the offering.  Based on the results from Table 5, we also include the directional 
variable, Change to Major Underwriter. The expected sign of this variable is negative:  those 
firms that are likely to employ a major investment bank for an IPO are less likely to rely on 
their related investment bank.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
banks, the self-selection coefficients were not statistically significant.   
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 Results in the Underwriter Affiliation equation indicate that issuers select related 
underwriters when total issue cost is low, offsetting the underwriter’ s attempts to underprice 
IPOs of related issuers.  The negative coefficient on Change to Major Underwriter indicates 
that issuers tend to use related underwriters unless they shift from a related non-major to a 
major underwriter.  The coefficient on the Book-building Regime indicator, in the model that 
combines both regimes, indicates that issuers are more likely to use their related underwriter 
in the book-building regime.  This is consistent with earlier discussions of the greater 
importance of investment bank relationships in the book-building regime.  
   Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Net Effects:  Do issuers benefit by using 
related investment banks or are they harmed?  Given the partial effects in Table 6, the answer 
is not clear.  It appears that related investment banks attempt to exploit bargaining power, but 
issuers who are faced with such attempts, choose to use non-related investment banks.  Table 
7 reports the results of an ordinary least squares estimate of total issue cost.  This model 
reveals the net effects of the investment bank’s effort to exploit its bargaining power and the 
issuer’s effort to shop for underwriting services.  We find no significant difference between 
total issue cost of issues using related and non-related investment banks.  The estimated 
partial effect of the relationship is near zero in both regimes.  Thus, related issuers gain 
greater access but do not realize issue cost savings relative to using non-related investment 
banks.  For completeness, Table 7 includes a probit model of the choice to employ a related 
underwriter.  As expected, coefficients on total issue cost as an explanatory factor are weaker 
than when the system is estimated simultaneously. 
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 V. Conclusions 
In this paper we study the role of commercial bank relationships in IPO underwriting.  
Among other issues, we are interested in whether such relationships increase access to equity 
capital markets. In summary, main bank relationships to investment banks are valuable to IPO 
issuers in Japan.  Main bank lending relationships appear to give small firms, making small 
issues, greater assess to equity capital markets than they would have if commercial banks and 
investment banks were not related.  Large issuers whose main bank relationships are with 
small investment banks appear to be able to switch to large, non-related investment banks that 
are capable of managing larger offerings.  Also, issuers located outside of major money 
centers, and those that do not have main bank relationships with investment banks, are more 
likely to use major investment banks.   
The findings are important for policymakers who are concerned that close 
relationships between commercial banks and investment banks may result in conflicts of 
interest and self-dealing.  Such problems are most acute when financial markets are under 
stress and for those securities subject to significant informational asymmetries, like IPOs.  
Yet, even under such conditions we find that issuing firms benefit from relationships to 
commercial banks that are affiliated with investment banks.         
While we find evidence that related investment banks seek to exploit relationship-
based bargaining power by charging higher fees and/or by underpricing more, our evidence 
indicates that the investment bank’s bargaining power is limited and that issuers respond to 
high expected issue cost by using non-related investment banks.  On average, holding other 
factors constant, issuers who use related banks have greater access to equity capital markets 
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 and incur total issue costs that are comparable to those incurred by issuers who use non-
related investment banks. 
We find no significant evidence that IPOs underwritten by related investment banks 
are systematically over-valued by investors and no significant evidence that main banks 
attempt to exploit their relationships to issuers and underwriters by selling overvalued shares 
of issuers or using proceeds disproportionately to extinguish issuer’s debt owed to the main 
bank.  
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 Table 1 
 
Summary Statistics for Issuing Firms and IPO Attributes 
 
Sample means (medians) for 321 auction-method offerings and 163 book-building-method offerings by JASDAQ firms 
during 1995 through 1999.     
 






Panel (a)  Issuing Firm Characteristics 




     2.84*** 
Market Cap   Total shares outstanding x first aftermarket price, in 
millions of yen  
20428 
    (11103) 
34175 
  (8546) 
    -1.07 
Commercial  Binary variable, equals 1 if a commercial enterprise  31.15%  30.06%   0.18 
Manufacturing  Binary variable, equals 1 if a manufacturing enterprise  34.89%  30.67%   0.67 
Service  Binary variable, equals 1 if a service enterprise  19.31%  23.93%  -0.83 
Finance  Binary variable, equals 1 if financial enterprise  4.67%  1.23%    1.68* 
Transportation   Binary variable, equals 1 if transportation enterprise  4.99%  3.07%   0.75 
Other  Binary equals 1 if real estate, construction, mining  4.98%  9.82%  -1.36 
Money Center  Number of firms in the issuing firm’s prefecture that 
completed a JASDAQ IPO during the sample period 
119.8 
  (33.0) 
146.0 
(241.0) 
    -1.75* 
Panel (b)  Pre- and Post-IPO Performance 




    -5.50*** 




    -6.00*** 
Return 1  Market-adjusted return over one month after IPO  -2.8% 
(-4.4%) 
-8.4% 
   (-10.4%) 
     1.44 
Return 12  Market-adjusted return over 12 months after IPO  -1.8% 
(-9.7%) 
6.0% 
   (-30.9%) 
    -0.31 
Panel (c)  Offer Characteristics 




    -0.24 
Total Issue 
Cost 
Includes underwriting fees plus underpricing, as a 





    -5.93*** 
Working 
Capital 
Percent of primary proceeds used for working capital  22.1% 
  (0.0%) 
21.8% 









Repay Debt  Percent of primary proceeds used for debt repayment  34.3% 
(15.3%) 
22. 9% 
  (0.0%) 
   2.28** 
Other Use  Percent of primary proceeds used for other uses  5.3% 
(0.0%) 
16.2% 
 (0.0%)  
   -3.05*** 
Panel (d)  Relationships 
Related  
I-Bank 
Binary variable, equals 1 if issuing firm and investment 





    -0.02 
Major 
Underwriter 
Binary variable, equals 1 if the investment bank has 
market share > 10%, based on share of IPO business 





     0.17 
Data sources:  IPO Prospectus and Research Group for Disclosure.  Research Group for Disclosure identifies the main bank of the 
issuer based on the prospectus of the issuing firm.  Stock prices are from Toyo-Keizai Stock Price Data.      
 
***significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.  
Table 2 
 
Investment Bank and Main Bank Relationships 
  
Table shows market shares of IPOs for investment banks, main banks, and for those IPOs conducted by an investment 
bank that has the same main bank as the issuing firm (related bank).  Investment bank affiliations with main banks are 
identified on the basis of the main bank’s ownership of investment bank equity.  Research Group for Disclosure 
identifies issuing firm main banks based on credit relationships.  The table includes all investment banks that 
underwrote IPOs during the period of study and all related main banks.  A main bank can be related to more than one 
investment bank.  All figures in are percentages based on 321 auction-method IPOs or 163 book-building-method 
IPOs.  
 



























Nomura  Securities Sakura  Bank  32.7 8.1  2.5 33.1 6.1  2.5 
Daiwa  Securities  Sumitomo  Bank  17.4 5.3  0.9 20.9 8.0  3.1 
Nikko Securities  Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi  17.4  9.3  3.4  25.8  9.8  3.1 
Yamaichi  Securities  Fuji  Bank  13.1  8.1 1.9 0.6 9.2 0.0 
Kokusai  Securities Sakura  Bank  4.7 8.1 0.0 6.7 6.1 0.6 
Kankaku  Securities Dai-Ichi  Kangyo  Bank  5.0 10.9 3.4  2.5 15.3 2.5 
New Japan Securities  Industrial Bank of Japan  2.2  1.6  0.0  4.9  1.8  1.2 
Wako Securities  Industrial Bank of Japan  1.9  1.6  0.6  1.8  1.8  0.0 
Dai-Ichi  Securities Long-Term  Credit  Bank 1.2 1.6 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.0 
Sanyo  Securities  Daiwa  Bank  1.2 2.8 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 
Universal  Securities  Long-Term  Credit  Bank 0.9 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Okasan Securities  Industrial Bank of Japan  0.9  1.6  0.0  0.0  1.8  0.0 
Cosmo  Securities  Daiwa  Bank  0.6 2.8 0.3 0.6 1.2 0.6 
Tokai Maruman Sec.  Tokai Bank  0.6  10.3  0.6  0.6  4.9  0.6 
Ichiyoshi  Securities  Sanwa  Bank  0.0 5.9 0.0 1.2  11.7 0.0 
Marusan Securities  Industrial Bank of Japan  0.0  1.6  0.0  0.6  1.8  0.0 
None   Small Commercial Banks  0.0  35.5  0.0  0.0  31.9  0.0 
 
Bank Mergers: 
April 1996   Bank of Tokyo and Mitsubishi Bank formed Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi. 
April 2001  Sumitomo Bank and Sakura Bank formed Mitsui Sumitomo Bank 
January 2002  Sanwa Bank and Tokai Bank formed UFJ Bank 
April 2002  Fuji Bank, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank and Industrial Bank of Japan formed Mizuho Bank 
 
Financial Institution Bankruptcies: 
Yamaichi Securities, Sanyo Securities, and Hokkaido Takusyoku Bank all filed in November 1997.Table 3 
 
Comparative Statistics and Tests for IPOs Using Related and Non-Related 
Investment Banks  
 
Comparisons of issue cost, underwriter market share, issue details, aftermarket performance, and allocation of 
proceeds for 321 auction regime, and 163 book-building regime IPOs, and for the combined sample of 484 IPOs.  
Table reports tests of differences in means between IPOs underwritten by related investment banks and by non-related 
investment banks. An investment bank is “related” to an issuer if the underwriter and the issuer share the same main 
bank.  The “Underwriter Market Share” panel shows:  1) for those firms that select a related (non-related) investment 
bank: a) the average market share of the underwriter; b) percent of the deals done by a “major underwriter” (with a 
market share of 10% or more); and c) percent of the deals where the issuing firm is related to a major underwriter.  
“Default major underwriter” is a binary variable that equals 1 if the issuer is related (through a main bank) to an 
investment bank that is a major underwriter.                  
 
  Auction Regime  Book-building Regime  Combined 










t-value  t-value 
Issue Costs             
Total Issue Cost       8.1%      12.3%     -1.50      20.3%      29.3%     -1.53      -198** 
Underwriter Fees       3.2%        3.1%      1.47        4.7%        4.2%      1.34       1.49 
Underpricing       3.2%        9.2%     -1.50      15.6%      25.1%     -1.52      -2.02** 
Run-up 40      -6.1%       -3.4%     -1.51        0.4%        7.8%     -1.60      -2.11** 
IPOs with Positive Run-up 40     17.8%      35.1%     -1.99**      47.8%      69.3%     -1.45      -2.36** 
Underwriter Market Share             
Underwriter Market Share      14.3%      19.9%     -2.48**      17.1%      23.7%     -1.92*      -3.15*** 
Major Underwriter (% of obs)      62.2%      83.7%     -2.23**      60.9%      82.9%     -1.59      -2.79*** 
Default Major Underwriter (% of 
obs) 
    62.2%      26.4%      3.56***      65.2%      17.1%      3.54***       5.01*** 
Issue Details             
Firm Age        34.1         29.3      1.98**         29.6         24.1      1.33       2.37** 
Market Cap (millions of yen)     17544      20688     -0.42        8566      38382     -2.25**      -1.74* 
Shares Offered (thousands)       1258        1219      0.27        1029        1314     -1.82*      -0.62 
Issue Size (millions of yen)    2448.0     2772.4     -0.58     1227.3     3148.4     -2.70***      -1.89* 
Money Center         148         115      1.40          193          138      1.88*       2.19** 
Aftermarket Returns             
1 Month Mean Return      -2.0%       -2.9%      0.21      -17.4%        -6.9%     -1.12      -0.70 
1 Month Median Return      -4.6%       -4.3%        -22.7%        -9.3%     
12 Month Mean Return      -4.2%       -1.5%     -0.39      -42.8%       14.2%     -1.02      -1.10 
12 Month Median Return    -13.5%       -8.8%        -29.9%      -31.5%     
Allocation of Total Proceeds 
Secondary Proceeds to Total     41.1%      40.3%      -0.24      34.3%      39.7%     0.87      0.40 
Allocation of Primary Proceeds 
Working Capital     22.3%      22.0%      -0.38      12.5%      23.4%     1.21      0.62 
Capital Investment     45.3%      37.3%      -0.93      47.9%      37.6%    -0.73     -1.20 
Debt Retirement     29.7%      35.0%       0.64      24.2%      22.7%    -0.13      0.46 
Other Unspecified Uses       2.7%        5.7%       0.89      15.4%      16.4%     0.10      0.55 
***significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.   Table 4 
 
Comparative Statistics and Tests for IPOs Using Major and Non-major  
Investment Banks   
 
Comparisons of issue cost, underwriter market share, and issue details for 321 auction regime, and 163 book-building 
regime IPOs, and for the combined sample of 484 IPOs.  The table reports tests for differences in means of IPOs 
underwritten by major investment banks and non-major investment banks, where a “major” has a market share of 10% 
or more.  “Default major underwriter” is a binary variable that equals 1 if the issuer is related (through a main bank) to 
an investment bank that is a major underwriter.      
 
  Auction Regime  Book-building Regime  Combined 








t-value  t-value 
Issue Costs         
Total Issue Cost        12.1%      10.1%       0.80       28.8%       25.0%      0.53         0.76 
Underwriter Fees          3.1%       3.1%      -0.55        4.3%         4.3%     -0.11        -0.38 
Underpricing          9.0%       7.0%       0.79      24.5%       20.7%      0.51         0.75 
Run-up 40         -3.6%      -4.5%       0.53        7.7%         3.0%      1.11         1.07 
Underwriter Market Share         
Default Major Underwriter (% of 
obs.) 
      31.3%     32.3%      -0.11      27.7%         9.1%      2.04**         0.87 
Related Investment Bank (% of 
obs.) 
      10.8%     27.4%      -2.16**      10.8%       27.3%     -1.54        -2.68*** 
Issue Details         
Firm Age          29.1         33.7      -2.02**        24.4         26.4      -0.56        -1.84* 
Market Cap (millions of yen)       21809      13727       1.34     38540      16979       1.17         1.70 
Shares Offered (thousands)         1270        1032       2.94***      1319        1093       1.10         2.64*** 
Issue Size (millions of yen)      2848.8     2218.0       1.24    3152.8     1792.2       1.21         1.73* 
Money Center           115          139      -1.14         140          168      -0.97        -1.52 
Small Commercial Bank       37.5%      27.4%       1.14      33.8%      24.2%       0.81         1.42 
***significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. Table 5 
 
Regression Models of Issuer Relationships to Major Underwriter, Use of Major 
Underwriter, and Change to Major Underwriter for IPO Underwriting  
 
Estimates are based on 484 IPOs, combining the auction and book-building regimes. The dependent variable in the 
first (probit) model is a binary variable: =1 if the issuer is related to a major underwriter through its main bank; 0 
otherwise.  The dependent variable in the second (probit) model is a binary variable: =1 if the issuer uses a major 
underwriter for its IPO underwriting; 0 otherwise.  The dependent variable in the third (OLS) model, “Change to Major 
Underwriter,” is a directional variable:  =1 if the issuer did not have a related major underwriter and switched to a major; 
= 0 if the issuer did not change the size of the underwriter:  it either had a related major underwriter and chose to use 
that underwriter or switched to another major, or had a related non-major underwriter and chose to use that underwriter 
or switched to another non-major; and = -1 if the issuer had a related major underwriter and chose to use a non-major 
underwriter.       
 
  
  Issuer is Related 
to Major 
Underwriter 






 Coef.  z-value  Coef.  z-value  Coef.  t-value 
           
Firm Age (Ln years)    0.0950      0.80   -0.1934      -1.51  -0.0736   -1.68* 
Market Cap (Ln thousands of yen)    0.0613      1.01         
Issue Size (Ln thousands of yen)        0.1719       2.16**   0.0454    1.66* 
Small Commercial Bank        0.1610       1.01   0.4270    7.62*** 
Money Center    0.0039      6.51***   -0.0010      -1.50  -0.0008   -3.51*** 
Manufacturing    0.3525      1.16   -0.5365      -1.71*  -0.1978   -1.93* 
Commercial     0.1723      0.56   -0.2704      -0.84  -0.0822   -0.81 
Service    0.3055      0.97   -0.3718      -1.13  -0.1326   -1.24 
Finance     0.2855      0.64   -0.1057      -0.21  -0.1663   -1.03 
Transportation    0.2953      0.72   -0.1530      -0.34  -0.0931   -0.63 
Book-building Regime   -0.2813     -1.98**   -0.0038      -0.02   0.0894    1.66* 
Constant   -2.5755     -2.22**   -0.5241      -0.40   0.1606    0.36 
          
Obs.      484    484    484   
***significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. 
 
 Table 6 
 
Simultaneous Estimates of Total Issue Cost and Investment Bank Relationship 
 
Two-stage least squares estimates of total issue cost and investment bank relationship to the issuer are based on 321 
auction-regime IPOs and 163 book-building-regime IPOs, and on the combined sample.  The dependent variable in the 
first equation is total issue cost as a percent of aftermarket value, and in the second equation is a binary variable: =1 if 
the issuer chooses to use a related investment bank; 0 otherwise.  “Change to Major Underwriter” is a directional 
variable:  =1 if the issuer did not have a related major underwriter and switched to a major; = 0 if the issuer did not 
change the size of the underwriter:  it either had a related major underwriter and chose to use that underwriter or 
switched to another major, or had a related non-major underwriter and chose to use that underwriter or switched to 
another non-major; and = -1 if the issuer had a related major underwriter and chose to use a non-major underwriter.       
     
  






  Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef.  z-value 
Total Issue Cost Model             
Related Investment Bank      0.1264     1.64*     0.1618     1.19     0.1568     2.06** 
Underwriter Market Share (Pct)      0.0025     3.28***    -0.0000    -0.00     0.0014     1.80* 
Firm Age (Ln years)     -0.0297    -1.92*    -0.1390    -5.34***    -0.0857    -5.81*** 
Issue Size (Ln thousands of yen)     -0.0141    -1.56    -0.0236    -1.58    -0.0165    -1.96** 
Market Run-up (Day –40 to -1)      0.4736     5.68***     1.1345     9.70***     0.8862    12.40*** 
Aftermarket Return (Month 1)     -0.0183    -0.48    -0.0165    -0.31     0.0043     0.13 
Related I-Bank*Aftermarket Ret.       0.2426     2.32**     0.2791     1.24     0.2127     1.90* 
Book-Building Regime          0.0414     2.17** 
Constant      0.3705     2.51**     0.9384     3.92***     0.6221     4.47*** 
R-Squared       0.39        0.44        0.35   
          
Underwriter Affiliation Model          
Total Issue Cost (Pct of Market)     -1.1343    -2.37**     -0.2727    -1.86*    -0.4883    -3.11*** 
Underwriter Market Share (Pct)      0.0031     1.30      0.0037     1.29     0.0019     1.10 
Change to Major Underwriter     -0.1957     -5.19***     -0.3427    -6.20***    -0.2292    -7.52*** 
Firm Age (Ln years)      0.0537     1.41      0.0384     0.99     0.0334     1.21 
Issue Size (Ln thousands of yen)      0.0019     0.08     -0.0279    -1.29    -0.0098    -0.59 
Book-Building Regime          0.0945     2.33*** 
Constant     0.1048     0.26      0.6034     1.77*     0.3056     1.14 
R-Squared       0.12         0.24        0.16   
          
Obs       321         163         484   
***significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. 
 Table 7 
 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Total Issue Cost  
and Probit Estimates of Investment Bank Relationship 
 
OLS estimates of total issue cost and probit estimates of investment bank relationship to the issuer are based on 321 
auction-regime IPOs and 163 book-building-regime IPOs, and on the combined sample.  The dependent variable in the 
first model is total issue cost as a percent of aftermarket value, and in the second model is a binary variable: =1 if the 
issuer chooses to use a related investment bank; 0 otherwise.  “Change to Major Underwriter” is a directional variable:  
=1 if the issuer did not have a related major underwriter and switched to a major; = 0 if the issuer did not change the 
size of the underwriter:  it either had a related major underwriter and chose to use that underwriter or switched to 
another major, or had a related non-major underwriter and chose to use that underwriter or switched to another non-
major; and = -1 if the issuer had a related major underwriter and chose to use a non-major underwriter.            
  






  Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef.  t-value 
Total Issue Cost Model             
Related Investment Bank      -0.0147    -0.79     0.0335     0.62     0.0039     0.18 
Underwriter Market Share (Pct)      0.0018     2.91***    -0.0006    -0.37     0.0006     0.95 
Firm Age (Ln years)     -0.0160    -1.27    -0.1315    -5.23***    -0.0728    -5.68*** 
Issue Size (Ln thousands of yen)     -0.0105    -1.27    -0.0243    -1.64*    -0.0149    -1.86* 
Market Run-up (Day –40 to -1)      0.4081     5.77***     1.0847   10.12***     0.8207   13.18*** 
Aftermarket Return (Month 1)     -0.0002    -0.01    -0.0103    -0.20     0.0149     0.50 
Related I-Bank*Aftermarket Ret.      0.1652     1.87*     0.1141     0.75     0.0973     1.20 
Book-Building Regime            0.0534     3.05*** 
Constant      0.3049     2.29**     0.9578     3.98***     0.5906     4.46*** 
Adjusted R-squared       0.12        0.44        0.40   
          
  Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef.  z-value 
Underwriter Affiliation Model          
Total Issue Cost (Pct of Market)     -1.4424    -1.87*     -0.3370    -0.52    -0.8729    -1.87* 
Underwriter Market Share (Pct)      0.0065     0.61      0.0177     1.23     0.0083     0.96 
Change to Major Underwriter     -0.9005     -4.75***     -1.9364    -4.78***    -1.1194    -6.71*** 
Firm Age (Ln years)      0.4386     1.89*      0.4500     1.59     0.3832     2.21** 
Issue Size (Ln thousands of yen)      0.0245     0.19     -0.2212    -1.47    -0.0734    -0.79 
Book-Building Regime             0.2703     1.41 
Constant     -2.6118    -1.19      0.8892     0.37    -1.0675    -0.68 
Pseudo R-squared       0.17         0.35        0.21   
          
Obs       321         163         484   
***significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. 
 
 
 
 